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Abstract
Federated learning enables training collaborative machine
learning models at scale with many participants whilst pre-
serving the privacy of their datasets. Standard federated learn-
ing techniques are vulnerable to Byzantine failures, biased
local datasets, and poisoning attacks. In this paper we intro-
duce Adaptive Federated Averaging, a novel algorithm for
robust federated learning that is designed to detect failures,
attacks, and bad updates provided by participants in a col-
laborative model. We propose a Hidden Markov Model to
model and learn the quality of model updates provided by
each participant during training. In contrast to existing robust
federated learning schemes, we propose a robust aggregation
rule that detects and discards bad or malicious local model
updates at each training iteration. This includes a mecha-
nism that blocks unwanted participants, which also increases
the computational and communication efficiency. Our exper-
imental evaluation on 4 real datasets show that our algorithm
is significantly more robust to faulty, noisy and malicious par-
ticipants, whilst being computationally more efficient than
other state-of-the-art robust federated learning methods such
as Multi-KRUM and coordinate-wise median.
Introduction
Distributed learning has emerged as a mechanism to cope
with the increasing complexity of machine learning models
and the amount of data available to train them. Among ex-
isting approaches, federated machine learning has become
a popular implementation to build shared machine learn-
ing models from a federation of participants (McMahan
et al. 2017; Konecˇny` et al. 2016a; Konecˇny` et al. 2016b;
Shokri and Shmatikov 2015). In this approach, there is
a central node (server) that controls the learning process
and aggregates the information from the participants, com-
monly referred to as clients, which train the model locally
using their own local datasets. The clients then send the
model updates to the server that aggregates all the informa-
tion to update the shared model. Federated learning enables
building shared machine learning models while keeping the
clients’ data private. Federated learning can operate in dif-
ferent settings, including cases where the number of clients
is large, synchronous and asynchronous operations, or sce-
narios where the communications between the clients and
the server are slow or unstable (Konecˇny` et al. 2016b).
(Blanchard et al. 2017) showed that standard federated
learning strategies fail in the presence of faulty and mali-
cious clients. Thus, just one bad client can compromise the
entire performance and the convergence of the shared model.
To mitigate this limitation, different robust federated learn-
ing strategies have already been proposed in the literature
(Blanchard et al. 2017; Mhamdi, Guerraoui, and Rouault
2018; Yin et al. 2018; Damaskinos et al. 2019; Chen, Su,
and Xu 2017; Chen et al. 2018; Xie, Koyejo, and Gupta
2019b). These techniques have been proven to be robust
against Byzantine adversaries, including some poisoning at-
tacks (Huang et al. 2011; Nelson et al. 2008). Some of these
techniques rely on robust statistics (e.g. median estimators)
for updating the aggregated model (Blanchard et al. 2017;
Mhamdi, Guerraoui, and Rouault 2018; Yin et al. 2018;
Chen, Su, and Xu 2017), which can be computational ex-
pensive for large models and number of clients compared
to standard aggregation rules such as Federated Averaging
(McMahan et al. 2017). These techniques also disregard
the fraction of training data points provided by each client,
which can be limiting in cases where clients provide a sig-
nificantly different amount of data points to train the model.
Other approaches such as DRACO (Chen et al. 2018) require
to add some redundancy to achieve robustness and the data
provided by the clients may require leaving their facilities to
build client nodes with partially overlapping datasets.
In this paper we introduce Adaptive Federated Averag-
ing (AFA) a novel approach for Byzantine-robust federated
learning. We propose an algorithm that aims to detect and
discard bad or malicious client’s updates at every iteration
by comparing the similarity of these individual updates to
the one for the aggregated model. In contrast to other ro-
bust federated algorithms, we propose a method to estimate
the quality of the client’s updates through a Hidden Markov
Model. This allows us to define a mechanism to block
faulty, noisy or malicious clients that systematically send
bad model updates to the server, reducing the communica-
tion burden between the clients and the server and the time
required by the server to compute the aggregated model. Our
experimental evaluation with 4 real datasets show that our
model is more robust to different scenarios including faulty,
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malicious and noisy adversaries, compared to other state-
of-the-art methods such as Multi-KRUM (MKRUM) (Blan-
chard et al. 2017) and coordinate-wise median (COMED)
(Yin et al. 2018). We also show empirically that our pro-
posed method is computationally much more efficient than
MKRUM and COMED, reducing the time required to up-
date the model in the server at each training iteration.
Related Work
The first federated optimization algorithms based on the
aggregation of clients’ gradients were proposed in (Shokri
and Shmatikov 2015; Konecˇny` et al. 2016a; Konecˇny` et
al. 2016b). A more communication-efficient implementation
with Federated Averaging (FA) was described in (McMa-
han et al. 2017), where model parameters are updated with a
weighted average of the model parameters sent by selected
clients at each iteration.
As previous techniques are fragile in the presence of
faulty or malicious clients, different robust techniques have
been proposed in the research literature. (Blanchard et al.
2017) propose KRUM, a Byazntine-robust aggregation rule
based on the similarity of the gradients or updates provided
by all the clients at each iteration. They provide a theoretical
analysis that guarantees robustness under certain assump-
tions. As KRUM converges slowly compared to other ag-
gregation rules, the authors also introduce MKRUM, a vari-
ant of the previous algorithm that achieves similar perfor-
mance at a faster convergence rate. (Chen, Su, and Xu 2017;
Yin et al. 2018) introduce robust aggregation rules based
on the computation of the median for the model updates.
(Mhamdi, Guerraoui, and Rouault 2018) propose Bulyan
an recursive algorithm that leverages existing Byzantine-
robust aggregation rules, e.g. KRUM or COMED (Yin et
al. 2018), to improve robustness against poisoning attacks.
A framework implementing some of these aggregation rules
is presented in (Damaskinos et al. 2019). These methods fo-
cus on stochastic gradient descent approaches for comput-
ing the aggregated model (although they can also be ap-
plied for FA-based schemes), which can be very inefficient
communication-wise (McMahan et al. 2017). On the other
hand, these approaches assume that the clients have the same
(or a similar) number of training data points and, thus, the
proposed aggregation rules can be inefficient when some of
the clients have significantly more data than others. Finally,
the computational complexity for computing these aggre-
gation rules can be demanding, especially if the number of
clients or the number of parameters is large. In contrast, our
proposed robust aggregation rule is based on FA, i.e. it ac-
counts for the number of data points provided by each client
and is more communication-efficient. As we show in our ex-
perimental evaluation, the computational complexity is also
reduced compared to other robust methods such as MKRUM
or COMED.
(Xie, Koyejo, and Gupta 2019b) propose Zeno, a robust
aggregation mechanism that aims to rank the clients’ gradi-
ent estimator. Then, only the gradients of the top k highest
rated clients is considered for updating the model at each
iteration. However, the number of selected clients, k, must
be specified in advance. Our proposed approach, in contrast,
aims to identify and discard bad (or malicious) client’s up-
dates at each iteration, and then, uses the information from
all the good clients to compute the model update. This re-
moves the reliance on a pre-specified parameter k, and al-
lows us to utilize information from all clients, especially in
cases where there are few or no bad clients, which would
otherwise be discarded in the case of Zeno.
The research literature in adversarial machine learning
(Huang et al. 2011) has shown that learning algorithms are
vulnerable to poisoning attacks (Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov
2012; Mei and Zhu 2015; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. 2017),
where attackers can compromise a fraction of the training
dataset to manipulate degrade the algorithms’ performance.
Some of the robust strategies described previously have
been proven vulnerable against more subtle attack strate-
gies, including targeted poisoning attacks (Bhagoji et al.
2019) and backdoors (Bagdasaryan et al. 2018). Addition-
ally, more specific attacks targeting KRUM, COMED and
Bulyan (Baruch, Baruch, and Goldberg 2019; Xie, Koyejo,
and Gupta 2019a) have shown that it is possible to compro-
mise the performance of these robust techniques.
Adaptive Federated Averaging
In typical supervised learning tasks (including classification
and regression), given a training dataset with n data points,
Dtr = {xi, yi}ni=1, the parameters of the machine learning
model w ∈ Rd are learned by the minimization of a loss
function ` evaluated on Dtr:
min
w∈Rd
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(xi, yi;w) (1)
In a federated machine learning task we assume there are
K clients over which the data is partitioned in K datasets
(referred to as shards), Dk = {xki , yki }nki=1.1 In this case, we
can re-write the previous objective as:
min
w∈Rd
1
n
K∑
k=1
nk
n
Lk(w) (2)
where Lk(w) = 1nk
∑nk
i=1 `(x
k
i , y
k
i ;w) and n =
∑K
k=1 nk.
In distributed optimization the shards of the clients are as-
sumed to be IID, whereas federated optimization does not
necessarily rely on this assumption. Federated learning al-
gorithms can be trained with gradient descent strategies by
updating the parameters of the model from the local updates
provided by the clients. Thus, at each iteration t, a subset
of Kt ⊂ K clients is selected for synchronous aggregation,
i.e. the central node responsible for computing the aggre-
gated model sends the latest update of the model to the se-
lected clients. Then, these clients compute local updates of
the model using their own shards (e.g. by computing the gra-
dients of the loss function w.r.t. the model parameters) and
send the corresponding local updates to the central node,
which updates the model according to a defined aggrega-
tion rule (Konecˇny` et al. 2016a). Typical implementations
use gradient descent and compute the model updates in the
1The size of the clients datasets is not necessarily equal.
central node aswt+1 ← wt−η
∑
k⊂Kt
nk
n′ g
t
k, where η is the
learning rate and gtk = ∇wtLk(wt), and n′ =
∑
k⊂Kt nk.
However, this approach is not efficient in the communica-
tions between the central node and the clients. More efficient
implementations can be achieved using Federated Averag-
ing (FA) (McMahan et al. 2017), where the aggregation in
the central node is computed as wt+1 ←
∑
k⊂Kt
nk
n′ w
k
t+1.
In this case, the model updates from each client wkt+1 can
be computed locally over several iterations of gradient de-
scent, with wk ← wk − η∇wkLk(wk). If only one gradient
update is computed, FA is equivalent to the previous model.
FA updates the model by computing a weighted average of
the model updates provided by the different clients, taking
into account the number of training points provided by each
client.
However, all these techniques are not fault tolerant and
can be very fragile to malicious or faulty clients. Thus, it
has been shown that, with just one bad client, the whole fed-
erated optimization algorithm can be compromised leading
to bad solutions or convergence problems (Mhamdi, Guer-
raoui, and Rouault 2018; Blanchard et al. 2017). To over-
come these limitations, we propose Adaptive Federated Av-
eraging (AFA) an algorithm for federated learning robust to
faulty, noisy, and malicious clients. In contrast to FA, our al-
gorithm updates the model considering not only the amount
of data provided by each client, but also their reliability, by
estimating the probability of each client providing good (or
useful) model updates. Thus, at each iteration, given a set of
selected clients Kt that compute their model updates wkt+1,
the central node updates the model as:
wt+1 ←
∑
k⊂Kgt
pktnk
N
wkt+1 (3)
where pkt is the probability of client k providing good model
updates (according to AFA’s aggregation rule) at iteration t
and N =
∑
k⊂Kgt pktnk. The subset K
g
t ⊂ Kt contains the
clients that provide a good update according to the robust
aggregation criterion that we describe next.
Model Aggregation
The algorithm to compute AFA’s model aggregation is de-
tailed in Algorithm 1. Initially, we compute the model up-
date in (3) with the clients in G (all Kt clients in the first
iteration of the algorithm). Then, we compute sk, the simi-
larities of the aggregated model parameters, wt+1, with the
parameters provided by every client in G, wkt+1. In our im-
plementation, we used the cosine similarity, which provides
a normalized similarity measure in the interval [−1, 1] and
its computation scales linearly in time with the number of
parameters of the machine learning model. Note that other
similarity or distance metrics can also be applied (e.g. cor-
relation, euclidean distance).
We calculate the mean (µˆs), median (µ¯s) and standard de-
viation (σs) for the similarities computed for all the good
clients in G. Assuming that the number of malicious or
faulty clients is less than bKt/2c, i.e. more than half of the
clients are good, the median µ¯s must correspond to the sim-
ilarity value computed for one of the good clients. Then, by
comparing the relative position of µ¯s and µˆs we identify the
direction to look for potential bad client’s updates. Thus, if
µˆs < µ¯s most of the potential bad clients will have a simi-
larity value sk lower than µ¯s. Then, if sk < µ¯s − ξ σs the
update from client k is considered as bad. The threshold is
controlled by a parameter ξ. This can be the case of mali-
cious clients that perform attacks aiming to remain stealthy,
noisy clients whose shards differ from the data of the major-
ity of the clients and faulty clients that send to the server very
low values for wkt+1, compared to the majority of clients. On
the other hand, if µˆs ≥ µ¯s, updates are considered as bad if
sk < µ¯s + ξ σs. This can be the case of strong attacks, such
as malicious clients that collude to perform attacks that do
not consider strong detectability constraints. Moreover, this
scenario also includes faulty clients that provide very large
values for wkt+1 compared to the rest, so that sk will be very
close to 1 (when using the cosine similarity) for the faulty
client(s) and smaller for the genuine ones.
Algorithm 1 AFA robust model aggregation
Require: selected clients Kt, pkt , nk, wkt+1, wt, ξ0, ∆ξ, η
B ← {∅}, Bad clients’ set
G← {k : k ∈ Kt}, Good clients’ set
R← {1} (Initialize as a non-empty set)
ξ ← ξ0
while R 6= ∅ do
R← ∅, N =∑k∈G pktnk
wt+1 ←
∑
k⊂G
pktnk
N w
k
t+1, with N =
∑
k⊂Kgt pktnk
for k ∈ G do
sk = similarity(wt+1,wkt+1)
end for
Compute µˆs, µ¯s, σs for clients in G
if µˆs < µ¯s then
for k ∈ G do
if sk < µ¯s − ξ σs then
R← R ∪ {k}, G← G\{k}
end if
end for
else
for k ∈ G do
if sk > µ¯s + ξ σs then
R← R ∪ {k}, G← G\{k}
end if
end for
end if
ξ = ξ + ∆ξ, B ← B ∪R
end while
wt+1 ←
∑
k⊂G
pktnk
N w
k
t+1, with N =
∑
k⊂Kgt pktnk
return wt+1, G, B
As different kind of bad or malicious clients can be
present, we repeat the algorithm until no more malicious
clients are found (e.g. we can have scenarios with faulty
clients and weak attacks). As we iterate, we increase the
value of ξ by ∆ξ > 0 to limit the number of false posi-
tives, i.e. good clients’ updates classified as bad. Finally, the
algorithm returns the aggregated model update wt+1 com-
puted with the set of good clients in G. The list with good
b b b b b bgk0 g
k
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Figure 1: AFA Bayesian model to estimate the probability
of the clients providing good model updates.
and bad clients in G and B is also used to estimate pkt+1
with the Bayesian model we explain next.
The complexity to compute the aggregation rule in (3) is
O(Ktd) in time, where d is the number of parameters of
the model. The computation of the similarity of the client’s
updates w.r.t. the aggregated model also scales in time as
O(Ktd) in the case of using the cosine similarity or the
euclidean distance. This contrasts to KRUM (Blanchard et
al. 2017), where similarities are computed across all clients,
scaling as O(K2t d). Finally, computing µ¯s, the median of
the client’s similarities is O(Kt) on average when using ef-
ficient algorithms such as Quickselect (Hoare 1961). This
is much more efficient that other median-based aggregation
rules such as COMED (Yin et al. 2018), which requires com-
puting the median for all the model parameters scaling in
time, on average, as O(Ktd).
Learning the Quality of the Client’s Updates
We propose a Bayesian model to estimate the clients’ proba-
bility to provide good updates to the model based on the out-
come of the aggregation rule in Algorithm 1 across all itera-
tions. These probabilities are used to compute (3). We model
the ability of the clients to provide good model updates as a
Hidden Markov Model, as depicted in Fig. 1. Thus, gkt is
an unobserved random variable that represents the proba-
bility of client k providing good updates at iteration t. The
observed variables okt are binary random variables with the
outcome of Algorithm 1 for client k at iteration t, i.e. these
variables indicate if client k provided a good update accord-
ing to the aggregation algorithm. Finally, gk0 represents the
prior belief at t = 0. We model this prior as a Beta distribu-
tion with parameters α0 > 1, β0 > 1. In our experiments we
set α0 = β0, so that the expected prior probability for every
client is E{Gk0} = α0/(α0+β0) = 0.5. The value of α0 and
β0 also determines the variance of the prior, i.e. larger val-
ues of α0 and β0 imply a smaller variance. This can be used
to control the responsiveness of the model, i.e. the changes
in the posterior will be reduced for a smaller variance in the
prior. The posterior distribution p(gkt |ok1:t) can be computed
through recursive Bayesian estimation, so that:
p(gkt |ok1:t) =
p(okt |gkt ) p(gkt |ok1:t−1)
p(okt |ok1:t−1)
(4)
The likelihood p(okt |gkt ) can be modelled as a Bernoulli dis-
tribution, whereas p(gkt |ok1:t−1) is a Beta distribution with
parameters αt−1 = α0 + nkgt−1 , βt−1 = β0 + n
k
bt−1 , where
nkgt−1 and n
k
bt−1 are the number of good and bad updates
provided by client k until iteration t− 1. The posterior also
results in a Beta distribution with parameters αkt = α0 +n
k
gt
and βkt = β0 + n
k
bt
. Then, at each iteration we can compute
the probability of client k providing good updates, pkt , used
in (3) to update the model at each iteration, as the expecta-
tion of the posterior p(gkt |ok1:t):
pkt+1 = E{Gkt |Ok1:t} =
αkt
αkt + β
k
t
(5)
For simplicity, in the model depicted in Fig. 1 we assume
that all the clients are used at every iteration. However, the
application to the case where only a subset of clients is
selected is straightforward. In this case, at every iteration,
we just need to update the posterior of the selected clients,
whereas the posterior for the non-selected clients remains
unchanged.
Blocking Bad Clients
Robust aggregation methods for federated learning such as
(Chen, Su, and Xu 2017; Blanchard et al. 2017; Yin et al.
2018; Mhamdi, Guerraoui, and Rouault 2018) do not in-
clude explicit mechanisms to detect bad or malicious clients.
Thus, despite the robustness of these models to Byzantine
adversaries, they can be inefficient in terms of computation
and communication resources, as they allow bad clients to
keep sending useless model updates. In contrast, AFA allows
us to detect clients providing bad updates at every iteration
(see Algorithm 1). The Bayesian model in Fig. 1 enables
the characterization of clients according to the good and bad
updates provided across all iterations. Leveraging this infor-
mation, we propose here a mechanism to block malicious
clients. Thus, at every iteration, we compute the posterior
p(gkt |ok1:t) using (4), which results in a Beta distribution with
parameters αkt and β
k
t . Then, at iteration t, we block a client
k if:
Pr(Gkt |Ok1:t ≤ 0.5) = Φ(0.5;αkt , βkt ) > δ (6)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the
Beta posterior distribution in (4) and δ is an arbitrary thresh-
old. In our experiments we set δ = 0.95.
Once a client is blocked, the server does not select that
client anymore during the training process, increasing the
efficiency of the federated learning algorithm. For example,
in cases where all clients are selected at each iteration, i.e.
Kt = K, the blocking mechanism in (6) allows to reduce
the communication burden between the server and the client
nodes, as no information is exchanged between the server
and the blocked clients. The minimum number of iterations
required to block bad clients is determined by the parameters
of the Beta prior p(gk0 ). Thus, for big values of α0 and β0,
AFA will require more iterations to block the bad clients.
However, although small values can help to block clients
earlier, benign clients can also be blocked more easily.
Experiments
We performed our experimental evaluation on 4 datasets:
MNIST (LeCun et al. 1998), Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST)
(Xiao, Rasul, and Vollgraf 2017), Spambase (Hopkins et al.
1999), and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky 2009). The characteris-
tics of these datasets are detailed in the supplement. For
MNIST and FMNIST we trained Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) wtih 784 × 512 × 256 × 10. For Spambase we
also trained DNNs with 54 × 100 × 50 × 1. For CIFAR-
10 we used VGG-11 (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014), a
well-known Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) architec-
ture. For the optimization in the clients we used gradient de-
scent with a batch size of 200, training the algorithms for
10 epochs before sending the updates back to the server.
All the details about the architecture and the training set-
tings are also detailed in the supplement. For AFA we set
α0 = β0 = 3 for the prior on the client’s quality, ξ = 2
and ∆ξ = 0.5 for computing the threshold in the aggrega-
tion rule, and δ = 0.5 as a threshold for blocking bad clients
as in (6). We compared the performance of AFA w.r.t. stan-
dard Federated Averaging (FA), Multi-KRUM (MKRUM)
(Blanchard et al. 2017) and COMED (Yin et al. 2018). In
the experiments we set Kt = K for all the algorithms, i.e.
all clients are selected to provide mode updates at each iter-
ations (unless they are blocked in the case of AFA).
For each dataset we considered 4 different scenarios: 1)
Normal operation (clean): we assume that all the clients
send genuine updates computed on their corresponding
shards. 2) Byzantine clients (byzantine): similar to (Blan-
chard et al. 2017), bad clients send to the server model up-
dates that significantly differ to the ones from the genuine
clients. In our case, the faulty or malicious clients compute
the following update at each iteration: wkt+1 ← wt + ∆wkt ,
where ∆wkt is a random perturbation drawn from a Gaus-
sian distribution with mean zero and isotropic covariance
matrix with standard deviation 20. 3) Label flipping at-
tack (flipping): we performed a label flipping attack where
all the labels of the training points for the malicious clients
are set to zero. 4) Noisy clients (noisy): for MNIST, FM-
NIST and CIFAR-10 we normalized the inputs to the inter-
val [−1, 1]. In this scenario, for the selected noisy clients we
added uniform noise to all the pixels, so that x ← x + ,
with  ∼ U(−1.4, 1.4). Then we cropped the resulting val-
ues again to the interval [−1, 1]. For Spambase, where we
considered binary features (indicating the presence or ab-
sence of a specific keyword), we randomly flipped the value
of 30% of the features for all the samples in the datasets of
the noisy clients.
Robustness and Convergence
The results of our experimental evaluation are shown in Ta-
ble 1. We considered two cases with 10 and 100 clients for
the 4 previously described scenarios. For the byzantine, flip-
ping and noisy scenarios we let there be 30% bad clients,
as in (Blanchard et al. 2017). In each experiment we run 10
independent training splits, where we split the training data
equally across all clients. To assess statistical significance
of the results we performed a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test at
the 5% level. Thus, for each experiment in Table 1 we high-
light those results where one or two algorithms perform sig-
nificantly better than the others (according to the outcome
of the statistical test). From the results we can observe that
AFA is robust in all scenarios for the 4 datasets, i.e. the test
error of the algorithm is not significantly degraded compared
to the performance achieved in the clean scenarios. As ex-
pected, FA’s performance is significantly affected under the
presence of bad clients, especially in byzantine and flipping
scenarios. It is also interesting to observe that both MKRUM
and COMED are very sensitive to label flipping attacks, es-
pecially in MNIST, FMNIST and CIFAR-10 for the case of
10 clients. For example, in MNIST, MKRUM and COMED
test errors increases up to 78.98% and 11.55% respectively
in the flipping attack scenario with 10 clients, whereas AFA’s
error is just 2.96%, similar to its performance in the clean
scenario. MKRUM also offers a worse performance in the
clean scenario compared to the other algorithms, which is
especially noticeable in the case of CIFAR-10, where the er-
ror rate is 53.02%, i.e. a 20% more than FA’s error. This is
not the case for COMED, whose performance is similar to
AFA and FA when no bad clients are present, except for FM-
NIST, where COMED exhibits a better performance. How-
ever, COMED is not consistently robust to all the scenarios
considered in the experiment.
According to the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test at the 5%
level, AFA outperforms MKRUM with statistical signif-
icance in 25 out of the 32 different cases considered2,
whereas MKRUM just outperforms AFA in 1. On the other
side, AFA outperforms COMED with statistical significance
in 20 cases, whereas COMED just do it in 2. These results
support the benefits of AFA, which, in general, offers a bet-
ter performance than MKRUM and COMED across differ-
ent scenarios including faulty, noisy and malicious clients.
To analyse the convergence of the algorithms, in Fig. 2
we show the test error as a function of the number of itera-
tions on MNIST with 10 clients. From the results we can ob-
serve that AFA converges fast (compared to the other algo-
rithms) to a good solution in all cases. In contrast, MRKUM
converges to a worse solution for the clean, byzantine, and
noisy scenarios and does not converge for the flipping attack.
COMED shows a good convergence in all cases except for
the flipping scenario, where although the algorithm is stable,
it achieves a poor performance compared to AFA. The stan-
dard implementation of FA performs well on the clean case,
but it performs poorly for the byzantine and flipping scenar-
ios. For the sake of clarity, in Fig. 2 we omitted the result
for FA in the byzantine case as the error is very high (see Ta-
ble 1) compared to the other algorithms. Finally, in the case
of having noisy clients, we can observe that FA converges
slower, as the other algorithms seem to ignore the noisy up-
dates, which helps to speed-up training in the first iterations.
The results for all other datasets and scenarios are provided
in the supplement.
Detection of Bad Clients
In Table 2, we show the detection rate for bad clients with
AFA’s Bayesian model with the same experimental settings
as described before. In MNIST, FMNIST, and Spambase,
AFA is capable of detecting all bad clients in all scenarios.
2Note that in Table 1 we just highlight results in bold when one
or two algorithms significantly outperform the others.
MNIST
10 Clients 100 Clients
Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy
AFA 2.80± 0.12 2.99± 0.12 2.96± 0.15 3.04± 0.14 3.82± 0.09 4.03± 0.09 3.98± 0.08 3.97± 0.08
FA 2.56± 0.11 90.03± 0.59 8.48± 1.58 3.79± 0.17 3.86± 0.14 89.70± 0.73 90.20± 0.00 4.81± 0.09
MKRUM 3.96± 0.18 4.01± 0.13 78.98± 23.39 3.94± 0.13 4.68± 0.11 4.63± 0.14 4.62± 0.13 4.61± 0.13
COMED 2.82± 0.09 3.17± 0.16 11.55± 0.93 3.56± 0.09 4.08± 0.11 4.21± 0.13 7.32± 0.20 4.51± 0.10
FMNIST
10 Clients 100 Clients
Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy
AFA 14.72± 1.89 14.11± 1.16 15.45± 1.88 15.27± 1.89 15.72± 2.11 16.08± 1.88 15.99± 2.00 17.48± 1.32
FA 13.60± 1.62 89.27± 0.81 24.52± 11.23 15.55± 1.80 16.96± 1.50 89.55± 1.18 48.46± 21.44 18.95± 0.15
MKRUM 14.23± 0.21 14.28± 0.27 34.79± 3.12 14.21± 0.24 15.05± 0.36 15.00± 0.20 15.14± 0.30 15.25± 0.52
COMED 12.68± 0.22 13.33± 0.23 24.02± 0.76 14.43± 0.32 17.05± 1.37 15.95± 1.63 18.11± 0.35 18.38± 0.13
Spambase
10 Clients 100 Clients
Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy
AFA 6.59± 0.61 7.13± 0.61 7.09± 0.51 7.20± 0.84 6.89± 0.44 7.55± 0.41 7.06± 0.45 7.06± 0.61
FA 6.13± 0.30 47.73± 4.59 14.10± 6.87 7.55± 0.58 6.94± 0.53 44.64± 4.91 11.75± 6.41 7.86± 0.65
MKRUM 8.22± 0.52 8.30± 0.32 8.18± 0.35 8.19± 0.34 7.96± 0.48 7.61± 0.41 8.03± 0.38 8.01± 0.43
COMED 6.49± 0.30 6.96± 0.88 8.42± 0.50 6.96± 0.65 7.71± 0.43 7.69± 0.38 10.56± 0.62 8.53± 0.45
CIFAR
10 Clients 100 Clients
Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy Clean Byzantine Flipping Noisy
AFA 31.94± 0.88 33.15± 0.69 33.14± 0.81 31.61± 0.64 35.66± 0.58 36.83± 0.41 37.42± 0.62 35.68± 0.57
FA 30.11± 0.39 90.00± 0.00 72.75± 16.39 30.01± 0.43 35.84± 0.54 90.00± 0.00 80.21± 14.85 35.93± 0.62
MKRUM 53.34± 2.90 53.02± 2.45 58.33± 2.94 52.95± 1.11 77.65± 10.69 71.15± 3.41 77.54± 10.79 72.27± 2.42
COMED 32.61± 0.46 35.41± 0.47 43.99± 4.54 32.62± 0.37 35.68± 0.35 37.22± 0.35 63.87± 8.29 35.88± 0.27
Table 1: Averaged test error over 10 random training data splits for AFA, FA, MKRUM and COMED in different scenarios:
clean datasets for all clients, Byzantine adversaries, label flipping attacks, and noisy clients. For each scenario we considered
two settings with 10 and 100 clients with 3 and 30 bad/malicious clients respectively. Best results with statistical significance
at the 5% level, according to a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, are highlighted in bold.
Dataset 10 Clients 100 ClientsByzantine Flipping Noisy Byzantine Flipping Noisy
MNIST 100% (5.0) 100% (13.7) 100% (5.0) 100% (5.0) 100% (5.0) 100% (9.2)
FMNIST 100% (5.0) 100% (6.6) 100% (5.0) 100% (5.0) 100% (5.0) 100% (7.6)
Spambase 100% (5.0) 100% (5.1) 100% (7.4) 100% (5.2) 100% (5.8) 100% (5.6)
CIFAR-10 100% (5.0) 90% (8.0) 20% (32.7) 100% (5.0) 100% (13.1) 2.7% (84.1)
Table 2: Percentage of bad clients blocked by AFA and the average number of training iterations to block them.
Figure 2: Test error (%) as a function of the number of training iterations for AFA (red), FA (green), MKRUM (blue) and
COMED (black) on MNIST with 10 clients for normal operation (all benign clients) and 3 byzantine, flipping, and noisy
clients.
In CIFAR-10, all Byzantine clients are detected and, for la-
bel flipping attacks, AFA detects 90% and 100% of mali-
cious clients for the 10 and 100 clients’ cases respectively.
In contrast, for the noisy scenario, the detection rate is quite
low (20% and 2.7% respectively). However, as shown Ta-
ble 1, for CIFAR-10, AFA’s performance is not affected by
the presence of noisy clients, when comparing to the perfor-
mance obtained for the clean scenario.
As we set the values of α0 = β0 = 3, for the Beta prior
that models the quality of the client’s updates, and δ = 0.95
for the threshold to block bad clients, the minimum num-
ber of iterations required to block a bad client is 5. As we
can observe in Table 2, AFA is capable of detecting the bad
clients in a very reduced number of iterations. For example,
in most cases, it blocks Byzantine clients in 5 iterations. La-
bel flipping attackers and noisy clients are usually blocked
within 10 iterations (except for the noisy clients in CIFAR-
10). These results support the accuracy of the aggregation
rule in Algorithm 1 to detect bad updates and the usefulness
of the proposed Bayesian model to block bad clients. For ex-
ample, in the byzantine scenario, from the results in Table 2,
AFA would allow to reduce the communications between
the clients and the server by 28.5% compared to the other
algorithms, as we do not need to send updates to the bad
clients once they are blocked.
Computational Burden
Finally we performed an experiment to analyse the com-
putational burden of AFA compared to the other methods.
For this, we measured both the average time required for
the clients to compute the model updates and the average
time to aggregate the model in the server. We trained AFA,
FA, MKRUM and COMED using MNIST with 100 (benign)
clients for 100 training iterations. As in previous experi-
ments, we set the batch size to 200 and, at each iteration,
the clients trained the model for 10 epochs. For this experi-
ment, we did not consider the latency in the communications
between clients and server. From the results in Fig. 3 we can
observe that AFA is significantly more efficient than both
MKRUM and COMED to compute the aggregate model, re-
quiring, on average, 0.35 seconds to compute the aggregated
model as in Algorithm 1, update the Bayesian model and
check for possible clients to block. In contrast, MKRUM
and COMED required 4.51 and 3.68 seconds respectively
to compute the aggregate model in the server. As expected,
FA, the standard implementation, is the fastest algorithm, re-
quiring just 0.03 seconds to compute the aggregated model.
In the figure, it can be appreciated that, in this case, the
difference between the training time and the aggregation
time is huge for MKRUM and COMED. In other words, the
computational overhead introduced to enhance robustness is
very significant when compared to the standard implemen-
tation (FA). In contrast, AFA offers a more robust perfor-
mance (as shown in our previous experiments) with a re-
duced computational overhead when compared to MKRUM
and COMED. It is also important to note that, in the presence
of bad clients, the computational burden for AFA would be
even lower, as the effective number of clients would be re-
duced when the malicious ones are blocked.
Figure 3: Average training and aggregation time (in seconds)
for each iteration on the MNIST dataset with 100 benign
clients. Time measured on a standard desktop machine with
a GPU nvidia GTX1080 Ti.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented Adaptive Federated Averaging
(AFA) an efficient algorithm for Byzantine-robust federated
learning. The proposed algorithm is designed to detect and
discard bad updates at each iteration, updating the model
considering both the fraction of data points provided by
each client and the expected quality of the client’s model
updates. Our algorithm includes a Hidden Markov Model
to estimate iteratively the probability of each client provid-
ing good model updates. Compared to other robust feder-
ated algorithms, this also allows us to identify and block bad
clients, improving the robustness and communication effi-
ciency and reducing the computation.
Our experimental evaluation in 4 real datasets shows that
AFA is more robust than other state-of-the-art robust feder-
ated learning algorithms, including MKRUM and COMED,
when tested against different scenarios with malicious, noisy
and faulty clients. For example, we showed that MKRUM
and COMED are very sensitive to label flipping attacks,
whereas AFA’s performance is barely affected. We also
showed that AFA is very effective at detecting bad clients
and capable of blocking them within a reduced number
of training iterations. Finally, our experiments show that
AFA is more robust and computationally more efficient than
MKRUM and COMED.
Like MKRUM and COMED, our proposed algorithm
could still be potentially vulnerable to more subtle or less
aggressive attacks. Thus, future research avenues will in-
clude the investigation of mechanisms to detect and mitigate
more subtle poisoning attack strategies, including targeted
attacks (Bhagoji et al. 2019) and backdoors (Bagdasaryan et
al. 2018), which require a finer analysis of the client’s up-
dates and their similarities.
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Appendix A: Datasets
In Table 3, we show the characteristics of the four datasets
used in our experiments. For MNIST, FMNIST, and CIFAR-
10 we used the standard training and test splits as provided in
their respective datasets. For Spambase, we randomly split
the dataset with 80% training data points and the rest for
testing.
For MNIST, FMNIST, and CIFAR-10 the inputs are nor-
malized to the interval [−1, 1]. In the case of Spambase, we
considered the 54 features corresponding to the occurrence
of specific keywords in the emails, dropping the last 3 fea-
tures of the dataset related to the length of sequences of con-
secutive capital letters. We binarized the selected features,
i.e. we only considered the presence or absence of a keyword
in an specific email. We used this representation as it led to
improved model accuracy and more stability when training
the neural network.
Name # Training # Test # Features
MNIST 50, 000 10, 000 784
FMNIST 50, 000 10, 000 784
Spambase 3, 680 921 54
CIFAR-10 50, 000 10, 000 3, 072
Table 3: Characteristics of the 4 datasets used in the experi-
ments.
Appendix B: Models used in the Experiments
In Table 4, we detail the architectures and the settings used
for our experiments. For MNIST, FMNIST, and Spambase
we used (fully connected) Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
with 2 hidden layers and Leaky ReLU activation functions.
As Spambase is a binary classification problem, we used
a Sigmoid activation function for the output layer, whereas
for MNIST and FMNIST we used Softmax. For CIFAR-10,
we used VGG-11 which is a standard architecture for this
dataset. In all cases, we used a gradient descent optimizer
and dropout to prevent overfitting.
MNIST and FMNIST
- Architecture: DNN (784× 512× 256× 10)
- Hidden layer act. functions: Leaky ReLU
(negative slope = 0.1)
- Output layer act. functions: Softmax
- Optimizer: SGD (learning rate = 0.1, mom. = 0.9)
- Dropout: p = 0.5
SPAMBASE
- Architecture: DNN (54× 100× 50× 1)
- Hidden layer act. functions: Leaky ReLU
(negative slope = 0.1)
- Output layer act. functions: Sigmoid
- Optimizer: SGD (learning rate = 0.05, mom. = 0.9)
- Dropout: p = 0.5
CIFAR-10
- Architecture: CNN (VGG-11)
- Optimizer: SGD (learning rate = 10−3, mom. = 0.9)
- Dropout: p = 0.5
Table 4: Models and parameters used for the 4 datasets in
the experiments.
Appendix C: Convergence
In Figures 4-7, we show the classification test error as a
function of the number of training iterations for AFA, FA,
MKRUM, and COMED over all 4 datasets and all 4 client
scenarios considered (clean, byzantine, flippling, and noisy)
with 10 and 100 clients. We observe that AFA always con-
verges to a stable solution with low test error, whereas the
other algorithms are not robust to all scenarios. In the case of
MKRUM, we observe notably poor performance on CIFAR-
10 when compared to the other methods, as it converges
slowly in the case of 10 clients and converges to very high
test error in the case of 100 clients even in the clean scenario.
The results in these figures are in line with the results pre-
sented in the paper, showing the robustness of AFA com-
pared to all other methods.
Figure 4: Test error (%) on MNIST dataset as a function of the number of training iterations for the different federated learning
methods with (top) 10 clients and (bottom) 100 clients. The clean scenario indicates normal operation (all benign clients) while
the remaining scenarios, byzantine, flipping, and noisy, all have 30% faulty, noisy or malicious clients.
Figure 5: Test error (%) on FMNIST dataset as a function of the number of training iterations for the different federated learning
methods with (top) 10 clients and (bottom) 100 clients. The clean scenario indicates normal operation (all benign clients) while
the remaining scenarios, byzantine, flipping, and noisy, all have 30% faulty, noisy or malicious clients.
Figure 6: Test error (%) on Spambase dataset as a function of the number of training iterations for the different federated
learning methods with (top) 10 clients and (bottom) 100 clients. The clean scenario indicates normal operation (all benign
clients) while the remaining scenarios, byzantine, flipping, and noisy, all have 30% faulty, noisy or malicious clients.
Figure 7: Test error (%) on CIFAR-10 dataset as a function of the number of training iterations for the different federated
learning methods with (top) 10 clients and (bottom) 100 clients. The clean scenario indicates normal operation (all benign
clients) while the remaining scenarios, byzantine, flipping, and noisy, all have 30% faulty, noisy or malicious clients.
